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[ 
Regarding the origin of the Bank of China ot'lOO!1RfJ, 
Eduard Kann writes that "from the flaming ruins of the 
Ta Ching Government Bank emerged the Bank of China, 
its direct successor." Strictly speaking, however, the 
Bank of China came Into existence not though a reor· 
ganization of the defunct bank but as a new institution in 
its own right. This contention is supported by the fact 
that while the Ta Ching Bank *1i!f$lifJ was turned over to 
the Liquidation Committee, the launching of the new institu-
tion ,was undertaken independently by the newly appointed 
Preparatory Committee.1J With the fall of the Ching Dynasty, 
the Ta Ching Bank was inevitably forced into liquidation. 
During the initial phase of the Bank of China, however, 
which first appeared on the scene as the successor to the 
Shanghai office of the Ta Ching Bank, there remained in 
the new institution various features which clearly revealed 
the operating conditions of its predecessor. .It was hardly 
possible, therefore, to disregard the intimate relationship 
that existed between the two institutions, despite their 
nominal distinction as separate organizations. One of these 
features of primary importance was the policy followed 
by the new bank with a view to stimulating public 
confidence. It is hardly necessary to point out how 
important it was for' the new Republican Government of 
China to gain the confidence of its public. To this end the 
Government endeavored to indemnify the losses incurred by 
1) Eduard Kann, Modern Banknotes in China, Finance and Commerce, 
Aug. 4, 1937, p. 117; G. Vissering, On Chinese Currency, Vol. II, pp. 43-45. 
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merchants and other individuals as a means of removing 
distrust on the part of the public in connection with such 
pew government undertakings as the floating of loans and 
the issue of bank-notes, and with a view to facilitating 
. private investment in the Bank of China itself_ This policy 
was directly related to another important feature of the new 
organization, namely, the disposition of the assets and obliga-
. tions of the old institution_ Specifically, the new bank was· 
obligated to clarify the position as regards those rights and 
obligations in which both the old and the new institutions 
were mutually involved_ Consequently, the Bank of China 
was unable to· sever relations with those who had possessed 
interests in the defunct institution_') 
The Bank of China made its first appearance as the 
successor of the Ta Ching Bank, Shanghai, under the Pro-
visional Government of Nanking_ During the turmoil which 
persisted from October, 1911 to February, 1912, when the 
whole country was in a state of confusion, and suffered 
severely from panic and looting, the stockholders of the 
Ta Ching Bank petitioned the Government and secured 
permission to continue business under the new name of the 
Bank of China_ Accordingly, the new institution was launched 
on February 5, 1912 on the premises of the old Ta Ching 
Bank, Shanghai, and the liquidation of the former institution 
was set on foot. The new bank's head office at Peking 
could not open until August 1 due to of funds, although 
a Preparatory committee had been appointed for this purpose 
in June_ • 
The official inauguration of the Bank of China in Shanghai 
was still further delayed if one may judge from the Presi-
dential Mandate issued on Docember 26, 1912_ 
With reference to the rules that regulated the bank itself, 
it is claimed by kann ." On December 25, 1912, a Presidential 
Mandate was issued, promulgating the provisional regulations 
2) Chou Pao Luan )liJ71im. Banking History of China (in Chinese). pp. 
38-40. 
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of the Bank of China and exhorting that the said bank, which 
was in a position to control the money market of the entire 
nation, should keep a large reserve and consider it its duty 
to attend to financial emergencies within the country."") 
However, as the text of these regulations is inaccessible, the 
note· issuing function of the bank will be studied from the 
standpoint of the Bank of China Act promulgated on April 
15, 1913. The recommendation submitted in connection 
with the drafting of the Bank of China Act made it evident 
that the Ministry of Finance intended to operate the Bank 
of China as a central agency for issuing bank· notes and 
controlling the fiscal affairs of the National Treasury. This 
recommendation dealt with three major problems regarding 
the proposed institution. (1) Regarding the problem of whe· 
ther the central bank should be established under government 
ownership, preference was giYen to the iointstock type of 
organization, in consideration of various banking theories 
and the precedence established in other countries. (2) 
Regarding its capitalization, it was proposed that, in con· 
sideration of the growing financial stringency and general 
apathy in business undertakings consequent upon the 
revolution, the new institution should be opened provisionally 
with one·fourth of its capital subscribed by the Govern· 
ment, and that the remaining capital should be left for 
private subscription upon further improvement in financial 
conditions. (3) It proposed, in the third place, that the Bank 
of China should be established and operated as a fully 
empowered central bank which would staI5ilize the foundation· 
of financial activities in the Republic. 
Prior to this initial step, Dr. Chen Chi·toa l!iI!~iW, in May, 
1912, had been appointed by the republican Peking Govern· 
ment to undertake the work of reorganizing the government 
bank. .. It was intended to capitalise the bank with the 
Government's contribution of 8,000,000 taels, but this was 
not feasible, since the Treasury was empty. Under such 
3) Kann. op. cit., pp. 117-118. 
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circumstances Dr. Chen's mission was unfruitfuL However, he 
did his utmost to prevent the authorities from flooding the 
market with more unsecured bank notes."') 
According to Articles 1 and 2 of the Bank of China 
Act, the central bank was to be established as a joint·stock 
organization with a capital of 60,000,000 silver dollars, 
of which 300,000 shares were to be subscribed by the 
Government and 300,000 shares by the public. In accordance 
with these stipulations, the Finance Department was supposed 
to continue capital payment. However, in the Autumn of 
1915, the rules covering private contributions were modified, 
being subsequently approved by the National Assembly on 
September 13, and on the following September 30 the first 
revision of the Act was published. The revised Act provided 
regulations relative to officers and share·holders based upon 
private contributions to the capital fund. 
Later, in November, 1917, the bank submitted to the 
Finance Ministry revised regulations, which stipulated the 
allocation of paid·up capital in the following manner.') In 
undertaking to contribute 30,000,000 dollars to the capital 
of the Bank of China, the total amount of which was set 
at 60,000,000 dollars, the Government decided to advance 
provisionally one· third of the amount, or 10,000,000 dolIars. 
Of this latter amount, 3,000,000 dolIars was first advanced 
and the remainder was contributed in the form of 6% bonds, 
with a face value of 10,000,000 dollars and an estimated 
value of 7,000,000 dolIars. In 1915 an additional government 
contribution of 10,000,000 dollars and private contributions 
of the same amount were scheduled to be received. 
But no funds. were forthcoming from official sources, and 
'even in 1917, after the publication of the Regulations 
Governing Private Capital Contribution to the Bank of 
China, the capital funds paid in from private sources did 
4) Kann. op. cit .• p. 117. 
5) The Bank of China Act was originally promulgated on April 15. 1913. 
but was revised twice, the first revision by, the National Assembly was 
completed on September 30, 1915, and the second on November 21, 1917, 
when it was published as the Revised Bank of China Act. 
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not exceed 3,643,300 dollars. Owing to the precarious con· 
ditions prevailing in the country and the adverse influence. 
of the European War, it was hardly possible to expect a full 
subscription of the capital allotted to private sources. 
As a part of the additional Government contribution of 
10,000,000 dollars, the premises of the old Ta Ching Bank 
were included at an estimated value of 1, 281,000 dollars, but 
since the Government then withdrew a portion of the 6% 
bonds it had previously contributed, this addition to the 
Bank's capital did not represent any more than a change in 
the composition of its capitalization. By calling in additional 
funds amounting to 1,356,700 dollars of private subscription 
and by dint of cash contributions of 719,000 dollars from 
official sources, the total capital of the bank was to be 
increased to 10,000,000 dollars, with equal contributions of . 
5,000,000 dollars from official and private sources. The 
capitalization of the bank was originally stipulated in Article 
2 of the Bank of China Act, promulgated on April 15, 1913, 
but this ruling was modified on September, 2, 1915, as stated 
in Article 3 of the Regulations Governing Private Capital 
Contribution to the Bank of China, and was later superseded 
by Article 2 of the Revised Bank of China Act enacted on 
November 21, 1917. On December 8, 1917 the capital 
stock contributions registered an excess receipt of 2,279,800 
dollars representing subscriptions of 22,798 shares, and the 
bank's paid·up capital at last reached a total of 12,279,800 
dollars."J 
In accordance with Article 28 of the Revised Bank of 
China Act, shareholders of the bank adopted at their meeting 
the Bank of China Regulations consisting of 69 articles: 
which were submitted to the Minister of Finance and 
6) Tien Vue Dzen, Das Bankwesen in China, 1927, s. 51; Chou Pao 
Luan, op. cit., pp. 117-118. According to Kann (op. cit .. p. 117) for several 
years after its establishment, the capital actually available from official and 
private sources did not exceed $ 10,000,000. 
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approved on November 25, 1918.') 
While the paid·up capital available for business opera' 
tions did not reach the anticipated amount, as just described, 
the Bank of China steadily increased the number of its branch 
offices year by year, registering in 1917, 155 branches and 
sub·offices, and extending its business activities throughout 
the country, even as far afield as the Provinces of Kwangsi, 
Kansu and Sinkiang." 
The various offices of the bank were classified as 
follows: 
Head Office (General Supervisory Office),·Branches· 
{Sub.Offices Exchange Offices. 
There were 21 branches (the Yunnan branch was in 
course of organization), 61 suboffices and 73 exchange 
offices, making a total of 155 offices in all. The establishment 
of the General Supervisory Office was recommended by 
President Sa Fu·mao lIfiOlm in August, 1914 and was realized 
in September of that year and charged with the duty of 
supervising all the branch offices.") 
II 
The original Bank of China Act was approved and 
promulgated by the National Assembly on April 15, 1913. 
It was in Article 12 of that Act that the stipulation covering 
note issue was set forth, authorizing the Bank of China to 
issue banknotes in accordance with the Banknote Regulations, 
presently to be enacted as law: Pending the· enactment of 
7) The Bank of China Regulations roughly correspond to the Articles 
of Association of the Bank of Japan, with this exception that the former 
places the rules regarding Auditors in a separate chapter-see Chou Paa Luan, 
op. cit., p. 78. 
8) It is claimed by ,Kann (op. cit., p. 117) that despite its limited 
capital the bank's business expanded phenomenally, and by the close of 1915 
it owned nearly 150 branches. In reality, however, even including those 
branches the completion of which was doubtful at the end of 1915, the total 
number of branches did not exceed 124, comprising 18 branches, 54 sub· 
offices and 52 exchange offices. 
9) Chou Pao Luan, op. cit., pp. 80-81. pp. 85-107. 
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these regulations, the bank was to observe the provisional 
rules drawn up by the Department of Finance. 
The Revised Bank of China Act of November 21, 1917 
proposed no alteration' of the abo'.re·mentioned stipulation 
(Article 12) relative to note issue. Nor did the Bank of 
China Regulations, drawn up on January 25, 1918, in accord-
ance with the stipulations of Article 28 of the Act, incor-
porate any new element in Article 24 which dealt with the 
question of note issue. While the Bank of China Act did 
• not deviate in its provisions regarding note issue from the 
preceding regulations, the changes made in other articles of 
the Act had certain important bearings upon the suspension 
of note redemption, of which mention will be made subse-
quently. This fact should be specially noted for reasons' 
which will be stated, since it was responsible' for the subse-
qent changes in the functions undertaken by the bank. 
Prior to the enactment of the Banknote Regulations and 
other similar provisions, the issue of bank notes was con· 
trolled by ad interim rules known as the Provisional Bank 
of China Note Regulations which were promulgated by the 
Ministry of Finance.IO) Bank of China notes were issued in 
accordance with these regulations by the Bank of China and 
its agencies for certain specified purposes. They comprised 
the following five articles: 
The Provisional Regulations for the Control of the Bank 
of China Notes. 
1. Banknotes shall be issued by the Bank of China and 
its own agencies. 
2. Banknotes issued by the Bank of China may be used 
for the following purposes: 
a. , To defray all land taxes/') likin, and Customs duties 
in all the provinces. 
10) The date on which these regulations were issued is variously 
reported by Kann (p. 117), Chang Chi Yen *ilDl:ilI'i (Financial Problems in 
China, p. 84), and Chou PaD Luan (p. 131) as Dec., 1911, Dec., 1912 and Jan. 
5, 1913, respectively. 
11) Consisting of land and citizenship taxes which were later combined 
to facilitate collection. 
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b. To purchase railway and steamship tickets, or 
postage stamps, or defray telegraph charges. 
c. To pay the salaries of all civil and military 
officers. 
d. To pay all expenses involved in Government and 
commercial transactions. 
3. Banknotes issued by the Bank of China shall be 
redeemable at the said bank in the district of issue, 
as shown on the notes. 
4. Notes on the face of which two place names are 
imprinted shall be redeemable at either place without 
the imposition of remittance fees. 
5. Persons refusing to honour these notes, or attempting 
to discount them, shall be severely punished. 
The business of the Bank ·of China relative to the issue 
of banknotes was handled by the Department of Note Issue, 
which was placed under the supervision of its Head Office 
along with certain other departments such as the Department 
of General Affairs, the Department of Fiscal Affairs, the 
Department of Revenue, the Business Department, and the 
Department of the National Treasury. 
When the Supervisory Office was established in Septem· 
ber, 1914, the Business and Revenue Departments were 
detached from the Head Office and reorganized as the 
Peking Branch, while the other departments were placed 
under the supervision of the new office. 
Thus the Bank of China was empowered to issue bank 
notes on the basis of Article 12 of the Bank of China Act and 
exercised this privilege in accordance with Provisional Bank 
of China Note Regulations. During those early days, the 
notes issued by the bank comprised the following three 
classes: • 
1. Notes taken over from the old Ta Ching Bank, 
bearing engravings of Li Hung Chang *i1flil't. 
2. Notes printed in America, bearing engravings of the 
Emperor Huang 'JIi.w. 
, 
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3. Memorial notes printed in China."! 
During the first phase of the bank's history, the circula-
tion of Bank of China notes remained relatively small. This 
fact was attributed to general distrust of the Government 
subsequent upon the revolution, overflow into all markets 
of paper moneys issued by numerous private banks, and also 
to the confusion which existed in connection with the. 
redemption of Mexican and various other kinds of Chinese 
silver dollars. However, the appearance of the Yuan 
Shih·kai dollars (Yuan tou yin yuan -JltmilRl'Il') in December, 
1914 contributed to the creation of a uniform unit. In fact 
by 1919 the difference between Mexican and Chinese dollars 
had disappeared in the Shanghai market, with· the result that 
the public distrust of silver dollars as media of redemption 
was also removed."! 
The circumstances which accounted for the tardy circula-
tion of banknotes during these years are summarized by 
Chou Pao Luan !I<Illm as follows: HI 
1. There was an excess supply of paper moneys issued 
by various provincial governments, particularly after 
the revolution, over and above those issued by 
recognized private and foreign banks. 
2. There was a lack of unification in the policies of the 
National Treasury, and the central bank was as yet 
unsuccessful in its attempts to undertake note issue 
. and to operate as the agent of the National Treasury. 
3. In spite of the lack of unification in the monetary 
system, the circulation of banknotes as substitutes 
for silver dollars would have been possible had there 
been silver dollars which were accepted throughout 
the country. In fact, however, the monetary systems 
12) Chou Paa Luan, op. cit., pp. 130-131. • Kann mentions in his article 
(op. cit., pp. 118-119) various kinds of banknotes issued by the Bank of 
China between UH2 and 1936 including dollar notes, fractional dollar notes in 
j big money', small coin fractional dollar notes,. and copper banknotes. 
13) Kann, ibid., p. 118. 
14) Op. cit.. pp. 132-134. 
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in the various provinces were so confused that in 
addition to Chinese silver dollars, there were foreign 
silver dollars and other currencies in ,circulation . 
• 
The sit~ation was still more confused by the habit of 
, using silver taels and cash. Where there was such 
absence of 'uniformity even in the case of silver dollars, 
it was very difficult to secure a free circulation of 
banknotes.14J 
The reform proposed by Chou Hsiieh·hsi }liJ~ff~ in Novem-
ber, 1915 for the wider circulation of Bank of China notes 
was designed to realize (1) the gradual redemption of unse· 
cured paper moneys, (2) the progressive unification of the 
National Treasury, (3) and the substitution of a unified 
currency for the old silver dollars.") 
The fact that the volume of Bank of China notes 
showed steady increase during these years 















The opening of the Peking office of the Bank of China 
was somewhat delayed, but its Shanghai office was opened 
in the first year of the Republic, so that its history coincides 
with that of the new regime. Having been entrusted with 
the duty of acting as the agent of the National Treasury 
with the privilege of issuing notes accorded, in addition to 
15) Ibid., pp. 134-135. 
16) ,Kann, Op. cit .. P. 118; Tien,' B.nkwesen, s. 54. According to 
Chou Pao Luan, the total volume of Bank of China notes in circulation 






operating an ordinary banking business, the Bank of China 
is reported to have steadily improved in the sphere of 
operating ,results pari passu wjth the unification of the 
country under the new regime and the general improvement 
in financial conditions.") An incident which should be 
mentioned at this point is the suspension of note redemption 
and of payment of deposits to which the Peking office was 
compelled to resort in the Spring of 1916, as a result of the 
attempt on the part of Yuan Shih-kai l>1!!:iIIl. to seize the 
throne.") The bank had to undergo a variety of trials and 
tribulations· during those post·revolution days of unstaole and 
precarious conditions, despite the steady improvement in 
business. This forced issue of unsecured and irredeemable 
notes, however as reported by Kann, was" One of the worst 
experiences the bank had to undergo the course of its 
history.l9) 
Early in 1916, certa-in factions in Yunnan Province 
revolted against Yuan Shih-kai, in view of his attempt to 
ascend the throne. On account of this struggle, the demand 
for the redemption of banknotes became very heavy and 
the Bank of China 'i'l!>1mrr and the Bank of Communications 
xil!i:ll!rr in Peking am;! Tientsin found themselves in straitend 
conditions. Faced by this situation, the Notional Assembly 
resorted to the temporary measure of suspending note 
redemption and induced the Government to issue special 
ordinance on May 12, 1916. 
The Bank of China and the Bank of Communications, 
which had their head offices in Peking, were thus forced to 
. . 
suspend payment in 1916. This suspension was not brought 
about by their conduct of ordinary banking business, but 
entirely by the desperate need for funds, reported.to be in 
excess of $ 20,000,000, on the part of Peking Government as 
17) Vide, Bank of China Act, Articles 17-24. 
,18) The Head office was operated only for the purposes of supervision, 
while the actual business was carried on by the Peking branch. 
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a result of the CQUP attempted by Yuan Shih-kai. In despera-
tion, the Treasury offered to pledge the National Museum 
for $ 5,000,000, but the negotiations fell through and there 
appeared to be no other source of revenue aside from the 
cash reserves of the banks_ The Bank of Communications 
under Liang Shih-yi ~±JfJ, a political leader of the communi-
cations faction, was liberal in advancing money, but the Bank 
of China was lukewarm on account of open rivalry with the 
other bank In order to secure more control over the funds 
of the Bank of China, the Government on April 21, 1916, 
appointed one of the members of the cabinet to the directorate 
of the bank_ On May 12, 1916, the Government issued a 
moratorium declaring the suspension of specie payments by 
both banks, and sealed up all the silver reserves and deposits 
lying in their vaults. With reference to the circumstances 
that led to this 'drastic action, Kann speculates as follows:. 
"It is conceivable that during those three weeks the Bank 
of China was drained of· its silver holdings to such an extent 
that suspension became necessary. On the other hand, it is 
possible that the said bank was still relatively sound· and 
that it was suspended by the advice of Liang Chih-yi to 
become a companion in misery of the Bank of Communica-
tions. "20) 
Subsequent to the declaration of the moratorium the 
Government appointed a temporary finance committee to 
study possible corrective measures, and telegraphed on May 
14 instructions to the various provincial governments for the 
enforcement of uniform measures .. However, the conditions 
that prevailed in the various districts after the moratorium 
were. by no means uniform. Accordingly, some provinces 
demanded ,the suspension of note redemption, some favored 
temporary restrictions on redemption, while others advocated 
continued redemption of notes. In Peking the Chamber of Com-
merce came to the rescue, while in Tientsin a Committee for 
the Maintenance of Financial Order was organized to carry out 
20) Kann, op. cit., p. 141, August 11, 1937. 
, 
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relief measures. Th,e plans proposed laid emphasis upon the 
relief of the masses by coining small-denomination copper and 
silver dollar coins and facilitating their easy circulation by 
means of certain autonomous organizations which were to 
be established. Although the moratorium order applied to 
silver notes only, both banks had copper notes in circula-
tion as well, which also became irredeemable, causing distress 
among poorest section of the populace. 
It was then declared illegal to refuse to accept these 
irredeemable notes of the Bank of China and the Bank of 
Communications, or to dispose of them at rates below face 
value, and those who violated the order were to be severely 
punished in accordance with Article 9 of the Currency 
Law.") 
In spite of this prohibition of the. acceptance of notes 
at discount, merchants were forced by circumstances to 
raise their prices. The resulting sharp advance in the cost 
of living proved fatal to the poor, for there was no commen-
surate advance in wages.") The relief project inaugurated 
in Peking by the Chamber of Commerce was to establish 
promptly as many exchange offices as possible for the 
redemption of copper notes. 
The Bank of China eventuallY made some attempts to 
resume payment unconditionally, but the Bank of Communica-
tions seemingly preferred to remain in suspension.") The 
moratorium was put into effect in Peking, Tientsin and a 
few other places, but since the universal circulation of 
irredeemable notes gave rise to financial disturbances, as 
above mentioned, recommendations were put forward to cope 
with the situation. Finally the Bank of China resumed 
payment and eventually the other bank followed suit. It was 
on October 26, 1916 President Hsu En-yuan ~'fi!"'ft of the Bank 
of China, in response to demands from various quarters, 
21) Kann, op. cit., p. 142. Probably refers to Article 9 of the Enforce· 
ment Regulations of the Currency Law. 
22) Kann, p. 141. 
23) Ibid., p. 142. 
• 
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commenced the redemption of .notes· with the approval of 
the National Assembly. 
On June 3, 1916, the Peking Gazette reported that the 
note issue of the Bank of Communications aggregated 
$ 159,000,000 and that of the Bank of China $ 50,000,000.24) 
Chinese sources, however, fixed much lower totals, namely, 
$ 80,000,000 for the Bank of Communications and $ 34,000,000 
for the Bank of China. On the same day, the Peking Gazette 
reported, without eliciting any contradiction, that "it is 
definitely known that the coffers of the Bank of Communica· 
tions are empty." The notes of this bank were almost 
invariably quoted between 5 and 15 % below the Peking 
issues of the Bank of China'''. 
Certain changes having taken place, various measures 
were proposed for the remedy of the situation. One 
plan proposed by the Finance Minister recommended an 
arbitrary appreciation of the value of the currency, while 
another plan recommended by Wang ko·min 3'::R:!it and 
Tsao ju·lin Wik,* suggested the issue of loans for the redemp· 
tion of the Peking notes. The latter recommendation was 
finally adopted and there were floated the short·term bonds 
of May, 1918 and the 6% bonds of 1918, the proceeds of 
which were to be applied to the recalI of the notes emitted 
by the two banks. In the belief that this reduction in the 
number of notes in circulation would eventually enhance 
public confidence in them, the date on which these bonds 
were floated has come to be regarded a's the occasion on 
which fundamental plans were inaugurated for the adjust-
ment of the Peking notes,"') 
In this manner, alI the depreciated Peking notes were 
24) The total amount of Bank of China notes in circulation in 1916 is 
reported by the Peking Gazette as $ 50,000,000 and by Kann as $ 46,437,000. 
The Bank of China balance sheet for 1929, however. gives the figure for the 
same year (October) as $ 60,000,000. Since no details are available, these figures 
are cited merely for the sake of reference. • 
25) Kann. op. cit .. p. 14l. 
26) Chou Pao Luan, op. cit., pp. 155-157. 
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finally redeemed at par and in silver, although there was a 
lag of some ten years. By designation of the Finance 
Minister, these bonds were secured by the surplus from the 
customs revenue, and they were quoted in the market any· 
where from 44.3% (in 1922) to 98.5% (in 1926), in accordance 
with the political vissicitudes of the times. In concluding 
his account of this incident, Kann states that" This was the 
inglorious end of a large and unsecured issue of paper money 
which brought much misery to a very considerable portion 
of a peaceful population without commensurate gain to 
anybody."27) 
In reporting this incident to its shareholders at their 
general meeting, at which the balance sheet for 1929 was 
submitted, the Bank of China announced" The consolidation 
of such a large amount of irredeemable notes was borne 
partly by the government by floating loans and partly by 
the bank itself by the setting aside of certain appropriate 
funds." It was reported, further, "For ten years the bank 
had done its best to make the final settlement of this amount 
($ 60,000,000). The loss suffered by the country and by the 
Bank was very great. Such fact are worth remembering when 
the question of Chinese Currency is under discussion.")" 
It is apparent from the previous discussions that, being 
averse to support the policy of Yuan Shih·kai, the Eank of 
China and its various branches had deliberately ignored the 
moratorium order. Branches situated in neutral or independ· 
ent provinces shielded themselves behind the authority of 
local military governors. Particularly strong was the attitude 
of the Shanghai branch which completely refused to honour 
the order, and resorted to a different method, i.e., the 
appointment of foreign legal counsel. By turning over its· 
assets and liabilities to the custody and protection of these 
foreign trustees, the branch began, after May 13, to meet the 
demand for withdrawal of deposits and the redemption of 
its notes. 
27) Kann, op. cit., p. 142. 
28) Kann, op: cit., p. 142. 
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This step taken by the Bank of China, at Shanghai, was 
implemented by organizing a shareholders' union, in coopera-
tion with Shanghai business circ1es_ It is believed that this 
action on' the part of the branch contributed in no small 
degree in building up public confidence in the bank 
and in increasing the circulation of its notes. As a result 
of this experience, the bank considered it necessary 
that as a note issuing bank, it should remain independ-
ent of any outside influences, and accordingly, it petitioned 
the Government in November, 1917 with a view to 
securing a revision of the Bank of China Act. This course 
of action, taken together with changes that had been made 
in its capitalization, clarifies the circumstances under which 
the Bank of China sought a revision of the regulations. In 
order to secure the position of the bank, the recommenda-
tion proposed a revision of the regulations relative to bank , 
officers, stipulating that the president and vice-president of the 
bank be appointed from among the officers elected at a share-
holders' meeting.") Details of these revisions will not be dealt 
with in the present study. Through these changes, the Bank 
of China began to lay emphasis on its role as a commercial 
bank in contrast with the role of a central government 
bank; concentrating its business more largely upon private 
finance as distinguished from public business. In recording 
the growth· of the bank, it is significant to note that this 
revision 0( 1917 had an important bearing upon the phenom-
enal p.rogress it subsequently achieved, in spite of the unstable 
• social and economic conditions that prevailed during the 
early years of the republican regime.'") 
In the early years of the new regime, the Government 
made plans for the consolidation of paper currency by means 
·of a unified system of note issue. This was evidenced by 
29) Vide, Bank of China Act, Article 16; Revised Bank of China Act, 
Article 16; Bank of China Regulations, Article 26. 
30) Economic Research Bureau, Bank of China, Operating Results of 
Principal Banks in China during the Past Ten years (in Chinese), p. 48. 
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its effort to control the note-issuing functions of the 
central bank, for the purpose of consolidating the financial 
position of the Republic_ The bank, however, failed to 
monopolize the privilege of issuing notes, inasmuch as the 
Bank of Communications, estpblished by the Department of 
Communications in November 1907, continued to share· this 
privilege.") Toward the end of the imperial regime, the 
central government had proposed a unified control of bank-
notes. Nevertheless, it was stipulated, in the first article of 
the Banking Act enacted in 1908, that the issue of bank notes 
constituted one of the business activities of banking institu-
tions. As it result, this privilege came to be accepted as the 
legitimate business of any bank, and the system of multiple 
issue continued in operation. This tendency having persisted 
throughout the early years of the Bank of China, subsequent 
efforts to suppressing further issues or withdraw notes in 
circulation, in accordance with the Banknote Control Law 
(first enacted in October, 1916 and revised in 1920), proved 
futile.'" 
In view of this failure of the central bank to concentrate 
the functions of note issue, under its own control, there con-
tinued in circulation all kinds of paper currencies, to wit 
those issued by· provincial governments, special banks, 
ordinary commercial banks, joint foreign-Chinese banks 
and foreign banks in China. The consolidation of paper curren-
cies in China is a problem which should be studied con-
comitantly with the problem of unifying the currency system 
by.means of silver dollars, In turn, this latter problem may 
be more clearly understood through a study of various 
reform projects such as those proposed by Vissering and 
other students of the same school."') 
31) Vide, The Bank of Communications Regulations; Article 13 of the 
Revised Bank of Communications Act. 
32) Chang chi·yen. op. cit., pp. 107-109. 
33) G. Vissering, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 13, 14, 57, 111, 155, 156. 
